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The tweakable Even-Mansour construction yields a tweakable block cipher from a public random permutation. We prove post-quantum security of tweakable Even-Mansour when attackers have quantum access to the random permutation but only classical access to the secretly-keyed construction, the relevant setting for most real-world applications. We then use our results to prove post-quantum security—in the same model—of the symmetric-key schemes Chaskey (an ISO-standardized MAC), Elephant (an AEAD finalist of NIST’s lightweight cryptography standardization effort), and a variant of Minalpher (an AEAD second-round candidate of the CAESAR competition). 

Abstract Quantum teleportation is one of the fundamental building blocks of quantum Shannon theory. While ordinary teleportation is simple and efficient, port-based teleportation (PBT) enables applications such as universal programmable quantum processors, instantaneous non-local quantum computation and attacks on position-based quantum cryptography. In this work, we determine the fundamental limit on the performance of PBT: for arbitrary fixed input dimension and a large number N of ports, the error of the optimal protocol is proportional to the inverse square of N . We prove this by deriving an achievability bound, obtained by relating the corresponding optimization problem to the lowest Dirichlet eigenvalue of the Laplacian on the ordered simplex. We also give an improved converse bound of matching order in the number of ports. In addition, we determine the leading-order asymptotics of PBT variants defined in terms of maximally entangled resource states. The proofs of these results rely on connecting recently-derived representation-theoretic formulas to random matrix theory. Along the way, we refine a convergence result for the fluctuations of the Schur–Weyl distribution by Johansson, which might be of independent interest. 

We study the problem of encrypting and authenticating quantum data in the presence of adversaries making adaptive chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext queries. Classically, security games use string copying and comparison to detect adversarial cheating in such scenarios. Quantumly, this approach would violate no-cloning. We develop new techniques to overcome this problem: we use entanglement to detect cheating, and rely on recent results for characterizing quantum encryption schemes. We give definitions for (i) ciphertext unforgeability, (ii) indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, and (iii) authenticated encryption. The restriction of each definition to the classical setting is at least as strong as the corresponding classical notion: (i) implies INT-CTXT , (ii) implies IND-CCA2 , and (iii) implies AE . All of our new notions also imply QIND-CPA privacy. Combining one-time authentication and classical pseudorandomness, we construct symmetric-key quantum encryption schemes for each of these new security notions, and provide several separation examples. Along the way, we also give a new definition of one-time quantum authentication which, unlike all previous approaches, authenticates ciphertexts rather than plaintexts.